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THE USE OF THE CORPORATE MONITOR  
IN SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Jennifer O’Hare* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It’s an unusual role where you have veto power over the 
audit-committee chairman and over the CEO.1 
Statement of WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor 
The WorldCom2 securities fraud led to numerous lawsuits, several 
criminal convictions, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). It also 
led to a novel Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) remedy, which 
significantly increases the enforcement power of the SEC. In the 
WorldCom enforcement action, the SEC sought, and obtained, the judicial 
appointment of a “Corporate Monitor.” About two years later, when the 
Corporate Monitor’s work was done, he had caused the company to 
overhaul its corporate governance completely and to adopt several unique 
governance provisions. He had also exercised oversight over all major 
business decisions, including the sale of the company to Verizon. Put 
simply, his primary responsibility was to ensure that the company would 
not commit securities fraud ever again. 
The Corporate Monitor is something new in corporate and securities 
law and it represents the latest example of the SEC seeking to shift its 
enforcement responsibilities to the public companies it regulates.3 This 
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 1. See Joann S. Lublin & Shawn Young, Even as MCI Makes Strides, Monitor Stays, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 20, 2004, at B1. 
 2. Following the scandal, WorldCom was renamed MCI, Inc. and was eventually acquired by 
Verizon, Inc. See, e.g., Out of Chapter 11, WorldCom is Again MCI, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, 
at C13; Stephen Labaton, Judge Looks Into Modifying Terms of 2 Phone Mergers, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 8, 2006, at C3. For ease of reference, this article refers to the company by its original name, 
WorldCom. 
 3. The SEC has sought the Corporate Monitor remedy in several other cases. See, e.g., SEC 
v. Spear & Jackson, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18668, 82 SEC Docket 2464 (Apr. 16, 2004) 
(seeking a Corporate Monitor “to oversee” the company’s affairs); SEC v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 
Litigation Release No. 18550, 81 SEC Docket 3593 (Jan. 21, 2004) (seeking a Special Monitor “to 
protect the interests of Hollinger International shareholders”); SEC v. U.S. Technologies, Inc., 
Litigation Release No. 18031, 79 SEC Docket 2340 (Mar. 12, 2003) (seeking the appointment of a 
Corporate Monitor “to review and approve [the company’s] future disbursements and corporate 
actions”). In addition, the SEC has recently indicated that it might seek a Corporate Monitor in a 
potential action against DHB Industries, Inc. See Press Release, DHB Industries, Inc. Reports 
Receipt of “Wells Notice” From the Securities and Exchange Commission, DHB Indus., Inc., 
Form 8-K (May 25, 2006), available at http://www.secinfo.com/d11Amt.vcb.d.htm#1stPage 
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article explores this method of SEC outsourcing. Part II briefly discusses 
the SEC’s enforcement powers, including the use of ancillary relief in 
judicial enforcement actions. Part III reviews the role of WorldCom’s 
Corporate Monitor, beginning with his initial appointment and tracing the 
evolution of his authority at the company. In particular, this paper explores 
both the corporate governance changes that were imposed by the Corporate 
Monitor and his extended oversight of the company. 
Part IV considers some of the dangers of the SEC’s use of the 
Corporate Monitor in its enforcement actions, such as the potential of a de 
facto expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s power beyond the authority 
defined in the court orders and the danger that a Corporate Monitor with 
far-reaching powers will interfere with the ability of a board and corporate 
officers to manage the company effectively. The appointment of a 
Corporate Monitor, accountable only to the court, raises interesting issues 
of corporate law. This article analyzes whether the use of a Corporate 
Monitor conflicts with state corporate law and whether the appointment of 
the Corporate Monitor constitutes impermissible overreaching by the SEC. 
Part V concludes by recommending that the SEC seek an appointment of a 
Corporate Monitor only in very rare cases and publish guidance explaining 
when it will seek this ancillary remedy. Similarly, courts should articulate 
clear judicial standards that must be met before granting this extraordinary 
remedy. The final recommendation is a suggested judicial standard under 
which a court should appoint a Corporate Monitor only if the danger that a 
company will not comply with a court order to obey the federal securities 
laws outweighs the significant dangers associated with the use of a 
Corporate Monitor. 
II. SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS AND ANCILLARY 
REMEDIES  
A. SEC ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act) 
empowers the SEC to seek injunctive relief in federal district court 
whenever it appears that “any person is engaged or is about to engage in 
acts or practices constituting a violation” of the federal securities laws.4 To 
obtain the injunction, the SEC must show that there is a “reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
(disclosing that the SEC had notified the company that it was considering instituting an 
enforcement action). Corporate Monitors have also been sought in criminal cases, especially 
through deferred prosecution agreements. See, e.g., David A. Vise, AOL Settlement Includes Tight 
Controls, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2004, at E5 (noting that AOL agreed to hire a Corporate 
Monitor). 
 4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. II 2002). For a good 
discussion of the SEC’s use of the injunction, see Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. 
L. REV. 427 (2001). 
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likelihood” of future violations of the federal securities laws.5 When a court 
issues the injunction, it is required to provide a brief explanation of the 
reasons underlying the order.6 
In addition to an injunction, the SEC is also expressly empowered to 
seek other remedies including monetary penalties,7 orders barring 
individuals from serving as officers and directors of public corporations,8 
and other equitable relief,9 such as ancillary remedies.10 
B. CONSENT DECREES AND SETTLEMENTS 
Approximately 90% of SEC enforcement actions are settled. The SEC 
often files the complaint and the settlement simultaneously in federal 
court.11 The court is then asked to approve the settlement as a consent 
decree.12 
The incentives for each party to settle are obvious. For the resource-
strapped SEC, settlement is often preferable to a costly trial. For the 
defendant, settlement offers a variety of advantages.13 It is often cheaper for 
a defendant to settle than to go forward with a contested case. Settlements 
also limit bad publicity, especially because the SEC does not require the 
defendant to admit to any wrongdoing. In addition, a defendant may feel 
incredible pressure from the SEC to settle and, if the defendant refuses to 
settle, the SEC may claim of lack of cooperation, which could impact the 
sanctions the SEC decides to seek if the case is contested. Finally, the 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, 25 SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND 
STATE ENFORCEMENT § 5:5 (2006) (“[T]he test applied in practically all federal courts is whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will again engage in the 
violative conduct.”). 
 6. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: 
Every order granting an injunction . . . shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall 
be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts sought to be 
restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action . . . .  
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). 
 7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (Supp. II 2002) 
(imposing a three-tiered penalty scheme with penalties ranging from $50,000 to $500,000 for 
corporations). 
 8. See id. § 78u(d)(2) (stating that the court may prohibit any person from serving as officer 
or director “if the person’s conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director”). 
 9. See id. § 78u(d)(5) (“[A]ny Federal court may grant[ ] any equitable relief that may be 
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”). 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 11. See STEINBERG & FERRARA, supra note 5, § 3:60. 
 12. Here, the term “consent decree” is used to mean a court-approved settlement between the 
defendant and the SEC. As one noted commentator has stated, a consent decree is “an agreement 
between the parties to end a lawsuit on mutually acceptable terms which the judge agrees to 
enforce as a judgment.” Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 321, 325 (1988). 
 13. See THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 183–85 
(Richard M. Phillips ed., 1997). 
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defendant may decide to settle to avoid the potential collateral estoppel 
effects resulting from a successful SEC injunctive action. All in all, even 
innocent defendants have good reasons to agree to a settlement. 
Although the parties to a consent decree have by definition agreed to 
the injunctive relief, the court does not automatically approve the 
settlement. Because an SEC consent decree has the potential to impact the 
rights of third parties, the district court conducts a limited review of the 
agreement’s fairness. The standard set forth in most cases is that the court 
will approve the consent decree unless it is “unfair, inadequate, or 
unreasonable.”14 In making this determination, the court gives substantial 
deference to the administrative agency’s decision to settle the case. The 
limited nature of the review is understandable given the strong federal 
policy favoring approval of consent decrees.15 Moreover, because of the 
non-adversarial nature of the settlement process, a court would have 
difficulty receiving information tending to show that a settlement is unfair. 
Not surprisingly, courts approve most SEC consent decrees. 
C. ANCILLARY RELIEF 
In addition to seeking injunctions, the SEC commonly seeks “ancillary 
relief” to enforce the federal securities laws. The term “ancillary relief” 
refers to non-statutorily based remedies that supplement an injunction. 
Implicit in the ancillary remedy is the assumption that an order enjoining 
the defendant from future violations of federal securities laws will not be 
effective, so that more direction is needed from the court to ensure that the 
defendant will comply with the federal securities laws. 
One commentator observed three different categories of ancillary relief: 
(1) remedies intended to correct past violations of the federal securities 
laws, such as disgorgement; (2) remedies intended to preserve the existing 
condition of the defendant during the pendency of the action, such as an 
asset freeze or the appointment of a receiver; and (3) remedies intended to 
discourage future violations of the federal securities laws by regulating 
certain aspects of the defendant’s future behavior, such as the institution of 
corporate governance changes, the judicial appointment of board members, 
or the appointment of special investigative agents.16 
This third type of ancillary relief has been the subject of a robust 
academic debate that began in the 1960s and 1970s when the SEC first 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See, e.g., SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Unless a consent decree is 
unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.”). 
 15. See, e.g., SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[There is] already a strong 
federal policy favoring the approval and enforcement of consent decrees.”). 
 16. See George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal 
Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 869–72 (1983). 
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started to aggressively seek these remedies.17 Commentators have argued 
that the corporate governance reforms required by the SEC in its consent 
decrees can interfere with the effective management of a company.18 
Similarly, court appointment of SEC-approved directors can be a significant 
intrusion on shareholder suffrage, while the appointment of special 
investigative agents can undermine attorney-client privilege.19 And, finally, 
because it is doubtful that the SEC has authority to promulgate rules with 
the same far-reaching effect as the ancillary remedies ordered by a court, 
the judicial grant of ancillary relief presents a real danger of SEC 
overreaching.20 
Despite these criticisms, the SEC has sought, and has usually obtained, 
ancillary relief from the courts.21 The courts have easily found the authority 
to order these remedies.22 Historically, courts have relied on their inherent 
equitable powers—as opposed to a grant of power under the federal 
securities laws—as the basis for ordering ancillary relief.23 Courts have 
reasoned that “[o]nce the equity jurisdiction of the district court has been 
properly invoked by a showing of a securities law violation, the court 
possesses the necessary power to fashion an appropriate remedy.”24 
Although the courts in the past looked to their broad equitable powers 
to grant ancillary relief, courts now have statutory power to grant these 
remedies in SEC enforcement actions. As part of SOX, the ‘34 Act was 
amended to authorize the granting of “any equitable relief that may be 
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”25 In enacting this 
provision, Congress signaled its approval of the use of ancillary relief in 
SEC enforcement actions.26 
                                                                                                                 
 17. For a good discussion of the history of the SEC’s use of ancillary relief, see Morrissey, 
supra note 4, at 443–47. 
 18. See, e.g., James R. Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1779, 1805 (1975–1976) (“[Ancillary relief has] provided a means for governmental 
control of corporate management and decision-making . . . .”). 
 19. See, e.g., Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC 
Injunctive Actions, 31 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1328–30 (1975–1976) (discussing the attorney-client 
privilege). 
 20. See infra Part IV.E. 
 21. See Morrissey, supra note 4, at 447 (“By the late 1970s, ancillary relief had become a 
well-accepted expansion of the Commission’s authority.”). 
 22. As one commentator noted, “The most persuasive argument for ancillary relief in federal 
securities law is that the Supreme Court and many lower courts have approved such relief and that 
almost no judicial precedent has questioned it.” See Dent, supra note 16, at 869. 
 23. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on SEC 
Settlements, 47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1116 (1992). 
 24. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 25. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (Supp. II 2002). 
 26. A review of the legislative history revealed only one reference to the grant of the expanded 
equitable powers, in a discussion relating to disgorgement. The Senate Report states that: 
The Commission has also suggested that it should be allowed to obtain additional relief 
in enforcement cases. For a securities law violation, currently an individual may be 
ordered to disgorge funds that he or she received “as a result of the violation.” Rather 
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III. WORLDCOM AND THE CORPORATE MONITOR 
WorldCom perpetrated one of the most massive accounting frauds in 
United States history. Over a period of several years, WorldCom managers 
improperly inflated the company’s income by over $9 billion. After 
WorldCom announced that it would be restating its financial results, the 
SEC brought an enforcement action against the company contending that it 
violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. In the 
complaint, the SEC sought an injunction against further violations and 
sought monetary penalties. The complaint also sought fairly typical 
ancillary relief, such as orders prohibiting the company from destroying any 
documents and from making any extraordinary payments to WorldCom 
employees. In addition, the SEC asked the court to appoint a so-called 
“Corporate Monitor.” 
A. THE EVOLVING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OF THE CORPORATE 
MONITOR 
1. The Initial Appointment of the Corporate Monitor 
On June 26, 2002, the SEC filed its initial complaint, asking the district 
court to appoint a Corporate Monitor to “ensure compliance” with any court 
orders prohibiting the destruction of evidence or the paying of excessive 
compensation.27 Two days later, pursuant to a stipulation between the SEC 
                                                                                                                 
than limiting disgorgement to these gains, the bill will permit courts to impose any 
equitable relief necessary or appropriate to protect, and mitigate harm to, investors. 
S. REP. NO. 107-205, Title III(E) (2002). 
 27. Specifically, the SEC requested the following relief from the court: 
A. Permanently restraining and enjoining WorldCom from violating Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; 
B. Permanently restraining and enjoining WorldCom from violating Section 13(a) of 
the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-3 thereunder; 
C. Imposing civil monetary penalties on WorldCom pursuant to Section 21(d) of the 
Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u]; 
D. Prohibiting WorldCom and its affiliates, officers, directors, employees, and agents, 
from destroying, altering, or removing from the court’s jurisdiction any documents 
relevant to the matters alleged herein; 
E. Prohibiting WorldCom and its affiliates from making any extraordinary payments to 
any present or former affiliate, or officer, director, or employee of WorldCom, or its 
affiliates, including but not limited to any severance payments, bonus payments, or 
indemnification payments; 
F. Appointing a corporate monitor to ensure compliance with Items D and E,  
above; and 
G. Granting such other and additional relief as this Court may deem just and proper. 
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and WorldCom, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York ordered the appointment of a Corporate 
Monitor. The court did not immediately select the Corporate Monitor, but 
instead directed the parties to jointly propose a name to the court within five 
days.28 
On July 3, 2002, the court appointed Richard C. Breeden, a former 
Chairman of the SEC, to act as WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor.29 Although 
the appointment was not accompanied by a written description of the 
selection process, a transcript from the hearing indicates that Judge Rakoff 
selected Mr. Breeden from a list of three names pre-approved by both the 
SEC and WorldCom.30 
2. The Initial Authority of the Corporate Monitor 
Initially, the WorldCom Corporate Monitor had fairly limited authority. 
He had two main charges: prevent the destruction of evidence31 and prevent 
the payment of excessive executive compensation.32 The court was 
concerned that, without court oversight, WorldCom managers would 
                                                                                                                 
Complaint at 4, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2002). The SEC’s 
amended complaint is substantially similar. See First Amended Complaint at 10, SEC v. 
WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2002). 
 28. See Stipulation and Order at 3, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. June 
28, 2002) [hereinafter WorldCom June 28 Stipulation and Order]. According to the order, if the 
parties failed to agree by July 3, 2002, the court would schedule a conference to select the 
Corporate Monitor. Id. at 4. 
 29. See Memo to Civil Docket Clerk, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 3, 2002). 
 30. See Transcript of Record at 2, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 
2002) [hereinafter WorldCom Transcript of Record]. The names of the other two candidates were 
not disclosed during the hearing. See id. 
 31. See WorldCom June 28 Stipulation and Order, supra note 28, at 2. Pursuant to the court 
order, “the Corporate Monitor shall confirm that WorldCom has implemented reasonable 
document retention policies and the Corporate Monitor shall take reasonable steps to oversee 
compliance with those policies.” Id. at 3. 
 32. Id. at 2. The applicable portion of the court order reads in its entirety: 
Upon appointment by the Court pursuant to this Order, the Corporate Monitor for 
WorldCom shall have oversight responsibility with respect to all compensation paid by 
WorldCom. The intent of the parties is that the Corporate Monitor shall exercise its 
oversight responsibility to prevent unjust enrichment as a result of the conduct alleged 
in the Complaint and to ensure that the assets of WorldCom are not dissipated by 
payments that are not necessary to the operation of its business. For purposes of this 
Stipulation and Order, compensation is defined so as to include salary, as well as any 
severance payment, bonus, indemnification, gift, loan, reimbursement, advance, or 
consideration of any kind in excess of established salary, but does not include payments 
to reimburse employees for ordinary business expenses incurred. In exercising its 
oversight responsibility, the Corporate Monitor shall have discretion to determine the 
type of compensation to review and either approve or disapprove, as well as the 
discretion to determine the group of officers, directors and employees with respect to 
which such compensation shall be reviewed and either approved or disapproved. 
Id. 
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continue to receive the excessive salaries and perks that had been the norm 
at the Bernie Ebbers-run company. Thus, the Corporate Monitor was 
expressly authorized to either approve or disapprove all compensation 
payments made by WorldCom.33 
3. The Expanding Judicial Authority of the Corporate Monitor 
Although the Corporate Monitor’s role began as a way to ensure that 
WorldCom did not continue its widely-reported practice of paying 
excessive compensation to its current (and former) managers, Mr. 
Breeden’s authority quickly began to expand.34 First, very early in the 
proceedings, the court issued an order significantly expanding the definition 
of “compensation.” According to the court, compensation included not only 
payments made to WorldCom executives, but also payments made to any 
“outside advisor” hired by WorldCom.35 For example, the Corporate 
Monitor was given oversight and approval authority over payments made to 
WorldCom’s investment bank, restructuring advisors, and attorneys. 
Shortly after WorldCom’s bankruptcy filing, Judge Rakoff reiterated 
the breadth of the Corporate Monitor’s authority. He stated, “[t]o put it 
bluntly, it is the responsibility of the Corporate Monitor, among other 
responsibilities, to prevent unnecessary compensatory expenditures by the 
company, not only in the form of looting by miscreants but also in the form 
                                                                                                                 
 33. The order provides that the Corporate Monitor has the discretion to “approve or 
disapprove” compensation payments. Id. at 2. It also states that if the Corporate Monitor does not 
promptly approve a compensation payment, WorldCom could seek approval from the court.  
Id. at 3. 
 34. Interestingly enough, the expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s role appears to have been 
contemplated by the court from the beginning. During the hearing at which Mr. Breeden was 
appointed as WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor, Judge Rakoff stated that: 
[I]t may be . . . that he will have other functions to serve as time goes on. We don’t 
need to reach that today, because this will be a fluid situation that will evolve with the 
great assistance of both sides, and if and when it is necessary to have any discussions 
about the appropriateness of broadening the monitor’s role, we will, of course, have a 
public discussion here in court. 
WorldCom Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 4. 
 35. As the court stated: 
Lest there be any doubt as to the scope of [the Corporate Monitor’s] access, it means, 
among much else, that “outside advisors” hired, retained, or consulted by the defendant 
or by any of its officers, directors, agents, or employees, or anyone acting in concert 
with any of them, to help advise the company or its board in the current circumstances 
must, upon pain of contempt, make full disclosure to the Corporate Monitor of any and 
all information the Corporate Monitor requests (including, by way of example, their 
own compensation arrangements with the defendant and their advice to the defendant or 
its Board). Among others, such advisors include, by way of example, investment 
banking advisors like Goldman Sachs & Co. and outside investigators like Wilmer, 
Cutler & Pickering. 
Order at 1–2, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2002). 
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of excessive compensation of those who mistake a damaged company for a 
broken piggybank.”36 
To determine what was “necessary” to WorldCom’s operations, the 
court determined that the Corporate Monitor should receive information 
well beyond simple compensation arrangements. According to the court, 
Mr. Breeden was entitled to receive “complete information about every 
aspect of the business he deems relevant to his assessments” in advance of 
any company action.37 In addition, the order specifically stated that the 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Memorandum Order at 3, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14201, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 4963). 
 37. See id. Specifically, the order provided that the Corporate Monitor be provided with the 
following information: 
a. any document or information communicated by the company or any professional 
employed by the company to any of (i) the official committees, (ii) any debtor-in-
possession (“DIP”) lender, (iii) any participant in the bank group or (iv) any other 
creditor (any such person being a “Covered Party”). This includes, inter alia, 
financial or other reports, projections, analyses, proposals, covenant tests, or other 
written (including electronic format) material. 
b. any financial or other report, study, projection, analysis, proposal, presentation or 
other document relating in any way to material business decisions or the conduct of 
the bankruptcy (including any such item labeled “drafts” but nonetheless circulated) 
generated by any professional employed by the company and communicated to 
senior management of the company. This includes, inter alia, financial reports, 
restructuring proposals, downsizing analyses, disposition alternatives, “RIF” 
proposals and proposals to, or under discussion with, potential acquirors, lenders or 
investors. 
c. any plan, proposal or study, including conceptual issue reviews, relating to 
compensation in any form, including severance and retention programs of any kind, 
and including, without limitations, retentions of outside professionals or other 
advisors, including restructuring, investment banking or bankruptcy professionals 
employed by the company. 
d. any document or other material distributed to any one or more members of the board 
of directors (whether in that person’s capacity as a member of the board, any 
committee thereof, or of management). 
e. any proposal, termsheet, agreement, letter of intent, plan, analysis or other 
communication relating to (i) sale of assets or securities out of the ordinary course, 
(ii) merger or consolidation of the company or any subsidiary thereof with any other 
person or entity, (iii) any shutdown of service, termination of activities or 
abandonment of property or assets, and/or (iv) any other business decision 
ultimately requiring Bankruptcy Court approval, including any draft study or 
multiple scenarios for internal review. 
f. any business plan, plan of reorganization, plan of liquidation, or proposed 
recapitalization, or any draft or segment thereof (including exhibits, appendices, or 
material to be incorporated therein). 
g. any cash flow reports or memoranda of any kind, including reports of all activity in 
the DIP loan facilities of the company, and of any draft financial statement or 
revision thereof. 
h.  copies of any proposed retention agreement or motion relating thereto. 
i. copies of all filings with the Bankruptcy Court. 
98 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 1 
Corporate Monitor had to be granted access to any employee of WorldCom 
“to discuss any matter deemed relevant to the Corporate Monitor at any 
time”38 and had to be invited to any meetings or discussions between 
WorldCom and the persons involved in its bankruptcy proceeding, 
including, for example, the official creditors committees.39 Pursuant to this 
authority, Mr. Breeden was entitled to attend all WorldCom board and 
board committee meetings. The Corporate Monitor’s already expansive 
authority would soon increase even further, as a result of WorldCom’s 
consent decree with the SEC. 
4. The Effect of the Consent Decree 
In November 2002, WorldCom entered into a partial settlement with the 
SEC.40 As part of the consent decree, the Corporate Monitor was required to 
review WorldCom’s corporate governance41 and to issue recommendations 
concerning WorldCom’s future governance structure.42 In June 2003, 
several months before Mr. Breeden’s report was issued, WorldCom 
                                                                                                                 
Id. at *5–*7. 
 38. See id. at 5. 
 39. See id. at 6. 
 40. See Judgment of Permanent Injunction Against Defendant WorldCom, Inc., SEC v. 
WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter WorldCom Permanent 
Injunction]. As part of the settlement, WorldCom agreed to be permanently enjoined from 
violating the federal securities laws. This settlement did not include any judgment regarding civil 
penalties. The parties later agreed that WorldCom would pay a penalty of $500 million in cash and 
$250 million worth of stock in the reorganized company. See Consent and Undertaking of 
Defendant WorldCom, Inc., SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003). 
 41. Specifically, the Corporate Monitor was required to determine: 
(1) whether WorldCom is complying with recognized standards of “best practices” with 
respect to corporate governance; 
(2) whether WorldCom has sufficient policies and safeguards in place (a) to ensure that 
WorldCom’s Board of Directors and all committees of WorldCom (including 
without limitation the audit committee and the compensation committee) have 
appropriate powers, structure, composition, and resources and (b) to prevent self-
dealing by management; 
(3)whether WorldCom has an adequate and appropriate code of ethics and business 
conduct, and related compliance mechanisms; and 
(4) whether WorldCom has appropriate safeguards in place to prevent further violations 
of the federal securities laws. 
WorldCom Permanent Injunction, supra note 40, at 5–6. 
 42. The Judgment of Permanent Injunction also required that, following the Corporate 
Monitor’s report, the WorldCom board was required to report back to the court and the SEC “with 
respect to the decisions and actions taken as a result of each of the” Corporate Monitor’s 
recommendations. Id. at 6. 
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stipulated that it would adopt each of the Corporate Monitor’s corporate 
governance recommendations in full.43 
5. The Corporate Monitor’s Report 
In August 2003, Mr. Breeden issued his well-publicized corporate gov-
ernance report, Restoring Trust.44 In the 147 page report, the Corporate 
Monitor made 78 recommendations, including some that have been 
considered quite controversial.45 Many of the recommendations sought to 
increase shareholder power in the corporation by instituting provisions 
permitting shareholder nomination of directors,46 establishing an “electronic 
town hall” for shareholder communications,47 and requiring the company to 
include in its proxy statement certain shareholder proposals48—even if they 
could be excluded under the SEC’s current proxy rules. Other recom-
mendations were intended to strengthen the performance and effectiveness 
of the board of directors, including several rules relating to the composition 
of the board and board committees.49 Mr. Breeden also introduced board 
term limits with his recommendation that the board have at least one new 
member each year.50 In addition, because the Corporate Monitor traced 
many of WorldCom’s problems to its practice of paying excessive 
compensation to its management, the report contained several rules 
addressing the amount and form of executive compensation, including bans 
on the use of stock options51 and caps on annual executive comp-ensation.52 
The report also imposed several rules aimed at improving the accuracy and 
transparency of WorldCom’s financial reporting process, including the 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Stipulation and Order at 2, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y June 11, 
2003). If WorldCom later decided that it did not want to adopt one or more of the Corporate 
Monitor’s recommendations, the company would have to seek relief from the court. See id. 
 44. See RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF, 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. (Aug. 2003). 
 45. For example, a noted corporate lawyer criticized the report, stating that many of the 
recommendations “have long since been rejected by the regulators and lawmakers who have spent 
much time and effort considering these matters.” Report by Martin Lipton, Mark Gordon, & Laura 
Muñoz, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, “Restoring Trust” or Losing Perspective? 1 (Aug. 27, 
2003), available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk082803.pdf. See also Letter 
from Warren de Wied, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, A New Voice in the Corporate 
Governance Debate: The Recommendations of WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor 2 (Sept. 8, 2003), 
available at http://www.ffhsj.com/cmemos/030909_worldcom_monitor.pdf (stating that many of 
the recommendations were “highly controversial”). 
 46. See BREEDEN, supra note 44, at 43. 
 47. See id. at 114. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. at 49–60. For example, Mr. Breeden recommended that the WorldCom Board 
should ordinarily consist of ten directors. See id. at 49. All of these directors, other than the CEO, 
should be independent directors. See id. at 50. 
 50. See BREEDEN, supra note 44, at 56. 
 51. See id. at 95–96. 
 52. See id. at 82–87. 
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adoption of a dividend policy with a target payout of annual dividends of at 
least 25% of the company’s annual income.53 Finally, the Corporate 
Monitor attempted to establish an honest corporate culture at WorldCom 
through a new legal and ethics program.54 
B. THE CORPORATE MONITOR’S ACTIVITIES 
The above discussion traces the history of the expanding judicial 
authority of WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor, from a person initially 
charged with prohibiting the destruction of evidence and the payment of 
excessive executive compensation, to a person who was required to revamp 
the company’s corporate governance structure. As explained in more detail 
below, Mr. Breeden capitalized on this judicially-created authority and 
expanded his power even further to become arguably the most powerful 
person at WorldCom, a person involved in every important corporate 
decision. 
These important corporate decisions included compensation packages 
for the new management team. In fact, one of Mr. Breeden’s first 
significant actions was the approval of the pay package for Michael 
Capellas, WorldCom’s new Chief Executive Officer. Initially, the 
Corporate Monitor rejected the WorldCom board’s proposed employment 
agreement with Mr. Capellas, opining that it was “grossly excessive.”55 
Eventually, WorldCom agreed to reduce Mr. Capellas’s compensation.56 
But the Corporate Monitor was not satisfied with merely obtaining this 
salary concession. Before he would approve the pay package, Mr. Breeden 
required Mr. Capellas to sign an “Undertaking and Pledge,” which required 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See id. at 128. 
 54. See id. at 138–39. 
 55. See Andrew Backover, Judge Blasts New WorldCom CEO Capellas’ Salary Package, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2002, at 6B. Originally, the board proposed a compensation package that 
would pay Mr. Capellas $1.5 million in base salary, plus a signing bonus of $2 million and up to 
$1.5 million in performance-based bonuses. He would also receive $18 million in restricted stock 
in the post-bankruptcy WorldCom entity. See Debtors’ Motion Pursuant to Sections 363 and 105 
of the Bankruptcy Code for an Order Authorizing the Employment of Michael D. Capellas as 
President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Debtors, In re 
WorldCom, Inc., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-13533, Ex. A at 2–3, 7–8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y Dec. 9, 2002). 
See also id. at 2, 7–9. 
 56. Under the new compensation package, Mr. Capellas received the same salary, signing 
bonus, and performance based bonus. However, his restricted stock award was reduced by $6 
million to $12 million, contingent on the company emerging from bankruptcy, at which time he 
could receive an additional $6 million worth of stock, at the discretion of the Monitor and the 
company’s board. See Seth Schiesel, Revised Contract for WorldCom’s New Chief Executive Wins 
Approval From 2 Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at C10. See also Supplement to Debtors’ 
Motion Pursuant to Sections 363 and 105 of the Bankruptcy Code for an Order Authorizing the 
Employment of Michael D. Capellas as President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the Debtors, In re WorldCom, Inc., Ch. 11 Case No. 02-13533, Ex. A at 7–8 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y Dec. 16, 2002). 
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Mr. Capellas to agree to numerous corporate governance initiatives as a 
condition to employment.57 
Given the Corporate Monitor’s judicial charge to prevent WorldCom 
from paying excessive compensation, Mr. Breeden’s participation in this 
important corporate decision is not surprising. But a review of Mr. 
Breeden’s activities at WorldCom demonstrates that his power extended 
well beyond compensation decisions. In fact, the Corporate Monitor 
actively participated in the general business operations of WorldCom.58 His 
involvement was so significant that he has been described variously as an 
unofficial “company executive” and “unofficial board member” of the 
company.59 In addition to attending all board meetings and controlling the 
company’s monthly budget, Mr. Breeden was a significant player in high-
level corporate negotiations, including, for example, the negotiations that 
ultimately restored WorldCom’s ability to bid on government contracts 60 
and negotiations with WorldCom’s creditors. 
The Corporate Monitor also shaped WorldCom’s board of directors. He 
chose the new members of WorldCom’s board of directors61 and was 
instrumental in obtaining the resignation of a shareholder-elected member 
of the board accused of a conflict of interest transaction during the Bernie 
Ebbers era, even after the board refused to remove him.62 
Perhaps the most significant example of the Corporate Monitor’s power 
at WorldCom was the extraordinarily active role he played in the ultimate 
decision faced by any corporation: the decision to be acquired by another 
company. During 2005, two companies—Verizon Communications, Inc. 
and Qwest Communications International, Inc.—fought for control of 
WorldCom and required the WorldCom board to choose between the two 
                                                                                                                 
 57. For example, the Undertaking and Pledge required Mr. Capellas to develop disclosure 
policies beyond those required by the federal securities laws, to “support robust levels of capital 
investment in internal controls,” to help develop corporate governance mechanisms that will 
“advance the best interests of shareholders, creditors and the public at large,” and to help ensure 
that the board “has a membership that represents shareholder interests (and stakeholder interests 
broadly prior to emergence from bankruptcy).” See Order, Ex. A at 5, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 
No. 02 Civ. 4963, (S.D.N.Y Dec. 16, 2002). 
 58. In fact, Mr. Breeden had an office at WorldCom’s headquarters, right down the hall from 
the company’s CEO. See One on One With Richard Breeden, Corporate Monitor for MCI, 
Interview on Nightly Business Report (Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://www.nbr.com/archive/ 
transcript/2003/transcript082603.html#story2 (“[Breeden] has been sitting inside the company, 
two doors down from the CEO, watching everything that goes on there.”). 
 59. See Lublin & Young, supra note 1 (characterizing Mr. Breeden as an “unofficial board 
member”). 
 60. See id. (“Mr. Breeden was a key player in government negotiations that led 
to . . . restoration as a federal bidder [on government contracts].”). 
 61. See Barnaby J. Feder, Five are Chosen to Join Board of a Reorganized WorldCom, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at C2 (stating that Mr. Breeden recommended the new members of the 
board). 
 62. See Kurt Eichenwald, WorldCom Director Quits and Agrees to Pay For Using Plane, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2002, at C3 (noting that Mr. Breeden urged the board to remove the director, but 
the board determined that it did not have the authority to remove a shareholder-elected director). 
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suitors. Mr. Breeden was directly involved in the company’s negotiations 
with both Verizon and Qwest.63 In fact, some investors criticized the extent 
of his involvement and alleged that the Corporate Monitor unduly favored 
Verizon over Qwest in the takeover battle, even though Qwest appeared to 
offer a higher short term value to WorldCom shareholders.64 
IV. POTENTIAL DANGERS PRESENTED BY THE USE OF A 
CORPORATE MONITOR 
Although WorldCom is the most well-known example of a Corporate 
Monitor, the SEC has sought this ancillary remedy in several other recent 
cases and is likely to use this novel remedy again in the future.65 Therefore, 
it is important to consider the potential dangers associated with the use of a 
Corporate Monitor. 
A. DE FACTO EXPANSION OF CORPORATE MONITOR’S POWER 
The appointment of a Corporate Monitor leads to the potential for a de 
facto expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s power. “De facto” expansion 
means an expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s powers beyond those 
                                                                                                                 
 63. According to WorldCom’s public documents, Mr. Breeden participated in the decision to 
reject Qwest’s bid in favor of Verizon. See, e.g., Letter from Nicholas deB Katzenbach, MCI 
Chairman of the Board, MCI to Richard C. Notebaert, Chairman & CEO of Qwest 
Communications International, Inc. (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/ 
about/news/releases/ (follow 1 March, 2005 MCI Chairman of the Board) (“MCI’s Board, with 
the participation of the court-appointed Corporate Monitor[,] . . . has reviewed all options . . . .”). 
Published reports also indicate that Mr. Breeden was deeply involved in the negotiations. For 
example, the Washington Post reported, “Every time [WorldCom] delves into delicate discussions 
over whether to merge with Qwest Communications International Inc. or Verizon 
Communications Inc., it is doing so under the close watch of”  the Corporate Monitor. Yuki 
Noguchi, The ‘Sheriff’ of MCI; Watchdog Laid Down Laws Now Affecting Merger Talks, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 28, 2005, at E1. See also Jesse Drucker & Almar Latour, Qwest Weighs Proxy Fight 
for MCI, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2005, at A6 (reporting that MCI rejected Qwest’s bid after the 
Qwest CEO spoke with Mr. Breeden). 
 64. See, e.g., Noguchi, supra note 63 (“[S]ome shareholders argu[ed] that [Mr. Breeden] has 
been biased towards Verizon’s offer from the start.”). See also Almar Latour et al., Verizon 
Regains an Edge, For Now, In Bid for MCI, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at A1 (“‘How could 
[WorldCom’s] corporate monitor and board allow this to happen?’” (quoting Leon Cooperman, 
the chairman and chief executive of Omega Advisors Inc., which owns about 12 million shares of 
MCI)). In addition to Mr. Breeden’s direct influence on WorldCom’s decision to be acquired by 
Verizon, the Corporate Monitor also may have had a more subtle, indirect influence on the 
outcome. As part of the corporate governance changes made by WorldCom at the direction of the 
Corporate Monitor, the WorldCom board adopted certain guidelines. According to these 
guidelines, the WorldCom board’s role was to “maximize the long-term value of the Company for 
its shareholders” by, inter alia, “addressing the concerns of other interested parties including 
employees, customers, suppliers, government and regulatory officials, communities and the public 
at large.” See MCI, INC. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES (on file with Brooklyn Journal 
of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law). By permitting the WorldCom board to focus on 
long-term value and “other constituencies,” these guidelines may have helped defeat Qwest’s bid. 
See Ken Belson, Why MCI Is Turning Up Its Nose at $1.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005,  
at C3. 
 65. See supra note 3. 
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specifically defined by the relevant court orders. The judicial power to 
“monitor” or “oversee” a company’s management creates the danger of 
non-judicial expansion of the Corporate Monitor’s power. 
An examination of WorldCom illustrates this phenomenon. The court 
orders defining the authority of the WorldCom Corporate Monitor did not 
expressly grant Mr. Breeden the power to participate in the business 
operations of WorldCom. Nor did the orders authorize Mr. Breeden to 
negotiate a merger agreement or to select the names of individuals who 
would serve on the new WorldCom board. Instead, it’s likely Mr. Breeden 
derived these powers from the Corporate Monitor’s general oversight 
authority. Judge Rakoff wanted Mr. Breeden to be his eyes and ears so that 
the court could determine whether WorldCom had changed its ways.66 
Presumably, if Mr. Breeden was not satisfied with what he observed, he 
would report back to the court with recommendations, and the court would 
order WorldCom to comply with Mr. Breeden’s recommendations. This 
gave Mr. Breeden tremendous leverage to increase his power at the 
company beyond the scope of his defined authority, and he appeared to do 
this with the tacit approval of the court. 
Mr. Breeden’s de facto power also increased because WorldCom was 
unlikely to challenge his role at the company. To recover from the 
tremendous scandal it was vitally important for WorldCom to convince the 
investing public that the company was fully committed to reform. Any 
conflict with the Corporate Monitor, no matter how justified, would lead the 
investing public to conclude that WorldCom was dragging its feet on its 
promise to become a good corporate citizen. Therefore, WorldCom had to 
avoid any public disagreement with Mr. Breeden. WorldCom’s strategic 
decision to accept Mr. Breeden’s active participation in its business 
permitted the Corporate Monitor’s power to expand to levels the court order 
had not contemplated. The danger of a de facto expansion of power is 
inherent in the use of a Corporate Monitor. Thus, any corporation that 
agrees to accept a Corporate Monitor would be in similar position. 
B. POTENTIAL INTERFERENCE WITH MANAGEMENT 
When the court appoints a Corporate Monitor with broad powers, he 
can interfere with the ability of the board and corporate officers to manage 
the company. The Corporate Monitor may interfere directly if a court 
defines the Corporate Monitor’s authority to trump decisions made by the 
                                                                                                                 
 66. As Judge Rakoff explained: 
The monitor’s client is a difficult, rather ornery client, namely me, and more 
abstractedly, the Court, and I want a hands-on monitor. I want a monitor who will 
report to me what is going on and, more importantly, feel free to look in any nook and 
cranny that is necessary to fulfill his functions. 
WorldCom Transcript of Record, supra note 30, at 3. 
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board or corporate officers. The Corporate Monitor may also interfere 
indirectly. 
The facts of WorldCom demonstrate the potential for direct interference 
by a Corporate Monitor. For example, although it is the board’s role to set 
executive compensation, the WorldCom judge placed that authority in the 
hands of the Corporate Monitor. Mr. Breeden used his judicial authority to 
veto Mr. Capellas’s compensation agreement. But by doing so, Mr. Breeden 
impeded what is arguably the board’s most significant responsibility, the 
selection of a CEO.67 Moreover, certain of his corporate governance 
reforms affected the discretion of WorldCom’s officers to manage the 
company. For example, the ethics pledge signed by Mr. Capellas as a 
condition to his employment contained several undertakings that restricted 
his discretion to manage the company.68 The CEO’s discretion was also 
impacted by the recommendations set forth in Mr. Breeden’s Restoring 
Trust report, which the company agreed to adopt as part of its SEC 
settlement. The report included a recommended dividend policy, which 
required WorldCom to set a target of paying annual dividends of at least 
25% of annual income.69 This cash commitment undoubtedly affected the 
decisions made by WorldCom’s management. 
The WorldCom Corporate Monitor also had an indirect—though no 
less significant—effect on management. The appointment of a Corporate 
Monitor with broad oversight authority means that a company’s 
management operates under close supervision. This supervision affects the 
way management performs. For example, in WorldCom, the decision to sell 
the company was made even more difficult for the directors because they 
had to consider the opinion of the Corporate Monitor. It is likely the CEO 
had an especially difficult time operating under a watchdog. As one 
WorldCom board member stated, Mr. Capellas “has sort of been playing 
with one hand tied behind his back.”70 The danger that a Corporate Monitor 
will interfere with the management necessarily accompanies the 
appointment of a Corporate Monitor. 
C. ACCOUNTABILITY   
A related concern is the accountability of the Corporate Monitor. 
Although a Corporate Monitor effectively may be managing a corporation, 
he is a court officer, answerable only to the court.71 The Corporate Monitor 
                                                                                                                 
 67. And, in fact, Mr. Breeden’s insistence on a lower pay package for the new CEO created a 
real danger that this sought-after executive might take a different offer. See Andrew Backover, 
Overseer Confident WorldCom Will Come Back, USA TODAY, Dec. 30, 2002, at 4B (“[Breeden’s 
veto] irked some creditors who wanted a new CEO as fast as possible.”). 
 68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 69. See BREEDEN, supra note 44, at 8. 
 70. See Lublin & Young, supra note 1. 
 71. For example, in WorldCom, the judge clarified the Corporate Monitor’s status as follows: 
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is not an agent of the shareholders; he is an agent of the court. The 
Corporate Monitor’s primary responsibility is not to increase shareholder 
value, or even to benefit shareholders; his primary responsibility is to 
further the court’s order. 
The Corporate Monitor’s allegiance to the court raises several obvious 
issues, which can be demonstrated by WorldCom. As discussed above,72 
Mr. Breeden’s initial responsibility was to prevent the destruction of 
evidence and to preserve corporate assets by prohibiting excessive 
compensation. Eventually, his primary responsibility shifted to overhauling 
WorldCom’s corporate governance scheme to prevent future fraud. 
WorldCom shareholders were undoubtedly benefited by Mr. Breeden’s 
reforms. However, a corporation’s goals are typically much broader than 
this and include financial goals, such as increasing sales, decreasing 
expenses, or improving market share. To the extent that a Corporate 
Monitor is charged with focusing primarily on one goal, other important 
goals may be neglected to the detriment of the corporation and its 
shareholders.73 The idea that a court-appointed individual could be 
managing a public corporation for long periods of time without any 
accountability to the shareholders is troubling, to say the least. 
D. EFFECT ON ABSENT SHAREHOLDERS 
The concern that the Corporate Monitor is accountable only to the court 
is exacerbated by the fact that the corporation’s shareholders have no input 
into the decision to appoint a Corporate Monitor and are not necessarily 
even aware that a Corporate Monitor is being considered by the court. As 
discussed above,74 novel ancillary remedies are typically imposed as part of 
a consent decree between the SEC and the corporation. These two parties to 
the agreement have every incentive to articulate the advantages of the 
                                                                                                                 
The Corporate Monitor, Richard C. Breeden, is an agent of this Court with such 
oversight responsibilities as set forth in the Court’s Order . . . and as the parties may 
otherwise agree or the Court may otherwise direct. The Corporate Monitor is not an 
officer, director, employee, or agent of WorldCom and shall not owe any fiduciary 
duties or other duties or obligations of any kind to WorldCom or WorldCom’s 
directors, officers, employees, shareholders, bondholders or creditor, or any person or 
entity other than this Court.  
Stipulation and Order at 1–2, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2002). 
 72. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 73. The argument that WorldCom’s management could have sought judicial relief if it 
believed that the Corporate Monitor’s actions were harming the corporation is not very persuasive. 
Even if the judge agreed, the judge would be forced to balance the goal of preventing securities 
fraud against other corporate goals. Balancing corporate goals is a difficult task, and a single judge 
would presumably be no better at it than the Corporate Monitor. Indeed, the recognition that these 
kinds of business decisions are best left to a corporate board is one of the foundations of the 
business judgment rule. 
 74. See supra Part II.C. 
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appointment of a Corporate Monitor—and no incentive to brief the court on 
the possible disadvantages. Although the interests of shareholders are 
significantly affected by the appointment of a Corporate Monitor who may, 
in effect, be managing the corporation, no one represents the shareholders’ 
interests to the court,75 nor are the shareholders likely to represent 
themselves. 76 
Absent shareholders ultimately bear the costs of the Corporate Monitor. 
These costs may be substantial,77 yet there is no real mechanism in place to 
control costs.78 The district court, which sets the terms of the Corporate 
Monitor’s engagement, has the power to disallow unnecessary or 
unreasonable Corporate Monitor bills, but it is doubtful that a corporation 
seeking to rehabilitate its public image would challenge the Corporate 
Monitor’s bills. The absent shareholders are the only group that would have 
reason to seek to control spending, but they do not have a voice in the SEC 
proceeding. 
E. POTENTIAL SEC OVERREACHING 
One of the primary responsibilities of the SEC is to enforce the federal 
securities laws, including the anti-fraud provisions. The SEC is assisted in 
its enforcement mission when it obtains the appointment of a Corporate 
Monitor charged with preventing the destruction of evidence. In addition, a 
Corporate Monitor who improves a company’s corporate governance could 
help prevent securities fraud, which also assists the SEC in its enforcement 
mission. But a Corporate Monitor who is empowered to overhaul a 
company’s governance structure also presents a danger of potential 
overreaching by the SEC.79 As the SEC more directly regulates corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 75. In fact, shareholders seeking to be heard might not be permitted to intervene in the SEC 
enforcement action. Several courts have interpreted Section 21(g) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 to bar intervention absent SEC consent. See, e.g., SEC v. Wozniak, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1241, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1993) (No. 92 C 4691) (“Only SEC’s consent can open a 
door in [the] wall to permit a private party . . . to have access to [the] federal court . . . .”). 
 76. Due to collective action problems and rational apathy issues present in most large 
corporations, shareholders have little incentive to appear in court to discuss the advantages or 
disadvantages of a Corporate Monitor. 
 77. For example, WorldCom agreed to pay Mr. Breeden his regular rate of $800 per hour, as 
well as to pay for appropriate staff and advisors. See WorldCom Transcript of Record, supra note 
30, at 3. Mr. Breeden’s bills were not made public, but according to estimates, he submitted bills 
of $300,000 per month. See Jonathan D. Glater, In Scandals, Another High Price to Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at C1. Published reports indicate he was paid more than $2 million for his 
work as WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor. See Lublin & Young, supra note 1. 
 78. Of course, if the company has sought the protection of the bankruptcy laws, the bankruptcy 
court may seek to control the Corporate Monitor’s bills, especially because there may be other 
constituencies—i.e., company creditors—who may have incentive to object to significant 
expenses incurred by the debtor company. However, this supervision by bankruptcy court may 
lead to other difficulties. See infra Part IV.H. 
 79. Possible overreaching by the SEC is not a new concern. As Professor Roberta Karmel has 
persuasively argued, “The Securities and Exchange Commission . . . has aspired to regulate 
corporate governance since its inception and, from time to time, has exploited scandals in the 
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governance, it moves into areas traditionally regulated by state corporate 
law, raising significant federalism issues. 
The federal securities laws have long been seen as disclosure statutes, 
while state corporate law has been viewed as governing the internal affairs 
of companies. Recently, this absolute distinction has changed, as SOX 
provided the SEC with limited power to regulate the internal affairs of 
public companies.80 However, nothing in SOX, or any other provision of 
the federal securities laws, provides the SEC with overarching power to 
regulate corporate governance. It is doubtful, for example, that the SEC 
would be able to promulgate rules requiring shareholder nomination of 
directors81 or rules placing caps on executive compensation.82 However, 
that is exactly what the Corporate Monitor did in WorldCom, which raises 
the concern of SEC overreaching. 
The SEC may run afoul of basic procedural protections provided by 
federal administrative law by choosing the ancillary remedy of a Corporate 
Monitor to advance SEC initiatives. Ordinarily, administrative agencies, 
including the SEC, use the rulemaking process to implement the relevant 
federal statutes.83 According to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),84 
rules can be promulgated only after a statutorily-mandated notice and 
comment period.85 By using a Corporate Monitor to further SEC policy, the 
SEC could be viewed as making an “end run” around the notice and 
comment requirements of the APA.86 
                                                                                                                 
public securities markets to achieve this purpose.” See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of 
William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate 
Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 80 (2005). 
 80. For example, under SOX, the SEC was empowered to promulgate rules directing the 
national securities exchanges to amend their listing standards to require independent audit 
committees. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. II 2002). 
 81. For example, the SEC was unable to promulgate rules that would have required 
shareholder nominations of directors. See Phyllis Plitch, Moving the Market: SEC Is Stymied on a 
Final Rule for Shareholder Access to Ballot, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2004, at C3. 
 82. Historically, the SEC has sought to regulate executive compensation, but has done so only 
through disclosure rules. Recently, for example, the SEC proposed rules that would require 
additional disclosure of compensation. See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8655, Exchange Act Release No. 53185, Investment 
Company Release Act No. 27,218 (February 8, 2006) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 
239, 240, 245, 249 & 274). 
 83. Commentators have noted that the SEC has attempted to articulate policy outside of the 
rulemaking process, through enforcement decisions and through no-action letters. See, e.g., 
ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 91–98 (Simon & Schuster 1982); Donna M. Nagy, 
Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Letters: Current Problems and 
a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 948–67 (1998). 
 84. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–553 (2000).  
 85. See id. § 553. 
 86. According to the APA, after the agency has published notice of a proposed rule in the 
Federal Register, “the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule 
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments . . . .” Id. § 553(c). The agency is 
required to consider any comments before adopting the final rule. See id. Commentators have 
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The SEC might argue that concerns of agency overreaching are 
unfounded. After all, the SEC should not be criticized for actions instituted 
by a judicially-approved Corporate Monitor. However, this argument is not 
persuasive for several reasons. First, as discussed below,87 the SEC plays a 
significant role in selecting the Corporate Monitor, which puts the SEC in a 
privileged position to appoint persons who will further agency policies. 
Second, although this is a relatively new ancillary remedy, most Corporate 
Monitors thus far have been individuals with close ties to the SEC, such as 
former senior staff or former Commissioners. And, finally, and perhaps 
most importantly, the scope of the Corporate Monitor’s work will be 
defined by the terms of a consent decree between the defendant corporation 
and the SEC. In WorldCom, for example, the SEC settlement authorized the 
Corporate Monitor to overhaul WorldCom’s corporate governance,88 which 
suggests that the SEC was seeking to regulate WorldCom’s corporate 
governance through the use of the Corporate Monitor. 
The SEC might also argue that one case does not by itself establish 
overreaching. But it can set a precedent for future appointments of 
Corporate Monitors with similarly far-reaching powers. The SEC may not 
even have to seek a Corporate Monitor in order to obtain concessions from 
companies in enforcement proceedings. The SEC may employ the simple 
threat of a Corporate Monitor to encourage a company to agree to corporate 
governance changes as part of its settlement with the SEC. In fact, as 
discussed below,89 that has happened at least once already. 
F. SEC INFLUENCE IN SELECTION OF CORPORATE MONITOR 
The SEC’s influence over the selection of the Corporate Monitor is 
closely related to the danger of SEC overreaching. It is the court’s 
responsibility to select the Corporate Monitor, but the court will look to the 
SEC for guidance. There are numerous advantages arising from the SEC’s 
involvement, including the fact that the agency is well-positioned to 
identify what is probably a small pool of potential candidates for the job. 
But with those advantages also come some concerns. The candidates 
suggested by the SEC are likely to have close ties to the agency and thus 
might have an unconscious enforcement bias. As discussed above,90 the 
SEC may view the appointment of a Corporate Monitor as an opportunity to 
pursue broader agency initiatives and will therefore suggest individuals who 
share those beliefs. The Corporate Monitor might also have his own reasons 
                                                                                                                 
identified several advantages of this process, including the production of better rules, “enhanced 
political accountability,” and fairness. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE 368–74 (4th ed. 2002). 
 87. See infra Part IV.F. 
 88. See supra Part III.A.5. 
 89. See infra Part IV.G. 
 90. See supra Part IV.E. 
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to advance the SEC’s agenda. Being selected as a Corporate Monitor can be 
a lucrative job.91 An individual who serves as a Corporate Monitor will 
understand that he needs to keep the SEC satisfied if he would like to see 
his name on an SEC “short list” for a Corporate Monitor position in the 
future. It is natural for the court to rely on the SEC for assistance in the 
selection process, but the court needs to recognize that the SEC may 
recommend candidates who see themselves as answerable to the SEC, as 
opposed to the court. 
G. CONFLICT WITH STATE CORPORATE LAW 
A Corporate Monitor may not be legal under state corporate law. As the 
scope of the Corporate Monitor’s power expands, there is a greater potential 
that his participation will interfere with the statutory scheme contemplated 
by state corporate law statutes. Although the Supremacy Clause would 
permit a federal district court to order an ancillary remedy that would cause 
a company to violate its law of incorporation,92 such an order would raise 
significant federalism concerns. 
Several arguments can be made that a Corporate Monitor with far-
reaching powers is illegal under state corporate law. First, if a Corporate 
Monitor can veto board decisions, there is an obvious clash with state 
corporate statutes that vest the management of a corporation with the board 
of directors.93 Similarly, if a board agrees to the appointment of a Corporate 
Monitor, the board might be seen as impermissibly delegating its powers.94 
In addition, to the extent that the Corporate Monitor is able to overrule 
decisions of a board, shareholders are deprived of their statutory right to 
elect the individuals who are supposed to manage the corporation.95 The 
shareholder franchise can also be affected if, like Mr. Breeden, the 
Corporate Monitor chooses interim directors or forces shareholder-elected 
directors to resign from the board. 
Because the Corporate Monitor is a relatively new remedy that has been 
ordered in very few cases, courts have not yet had to grapple with its 
legality. Two courts, a federal district court96 and the Delaware Chancery 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land.”). 
 93. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every 
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”). 
 94. See 1 Rodman Ward, Jr. et al, Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law § 141.1.3 
(4th ed. 1999) (“The board may not either formally or effectively abdicate its statutory power and 
its fiduciary duty to manage or direct the management of the business and affairs of the 
corporation.” (citing Ash v. McCall, C.C. No. 17132, slip op. at 17 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000))). 
 95. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211(b) (“[A]n annual meeting of stockholders shall be 
held for the election of directors . . . .”). 
 96. SEC v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., No. 04C0336, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3240 (N.D. Ill.  
Mar. 2), vacated, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004). 
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Court,97 have recently touched upon the issue in related actions. Both cases 
involve the battle between business tycoon Conrad Black and the 
independent directors of Hollinger International, Inc. (International), a 
public company indirectly controlled by Black. International was accused of 
making certain unauthorized payments to Black and later lying about these 
payments in public documents filed with the SEC. Following these 
accusations, the International board created a Special Committee to 
investigate Black. When Black’s misconduct was disclosed, the SEC 
brought an enforcement action against International, which ultimately 
entered into a consent decree with the SEC. As part of the settlement, 
International agreed to permit the Special Committee to continue its 
investigation into Black. To help effectuate this promise, International also 
consented to a “springing Corporate Monitor”98 provision, which provided 
that, upon certain triggering events, a “Special Monitor”99 would be 
appointed by the court “to protect the interests of the non-controlling 
shareholders”100 of International.101 These triggering events included actions 
by Black that might hinder the Special Committee’s investigation, such as 
the removal of any International director or the election of any new 
International director without the approval of 80% of the incumbent 
board.102 
In an emergency proceeding, a district court judge approved the consent 
decree.103 Several days later, Black intervened in the SEC’s enforcement 
action, seeking to have the Corporate Monitor provision vacated. He argued 
that the consent decree impaired his right to remove and elect corporate 
directors. The district court initially agreed, vacating the Corporate Monitor 
provision, primarily because the SEC had not given notice to Black of the 
emergency proceeding. In reaching this decision, the court was careful not 
to determine whether the Corporate Monitor provision violated state 
corporate law. It stated that “[a]lthough [Black] has shown [his] voting 
rights, as protected under Delaware law, could be impaired, the Court, at 
this time, does not make a finding that the [consent decree] is in 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 
2005). 
 98. See SEC Obtains Federal Court Order to Protect Shareholders and Preserve Corporate 
Assets of Hollinger International, Inc., Litigation Release No. 18551, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 1946 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
lr18550.htm; see also Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood LLP, SEC Update (Aug. 5, 2004), available 
at http://www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/SECAlertAug0404.pdf (“Hollinger International 
entered into a consent judgment in which it agreed to a ‘springing’ corporate monitor.”). 
 99. See Hollinger, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097, at *6. 
 100. Id. at 6. 
 101. The Special Monitor was a familiar name—Richard Breeden, who was also acting as a 
special advisor to International’s Special Committee. 
 102. See Hollinger, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097, at *7. 
 103. See SEC v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., No. 04C0336, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3240 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
2), vacated, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2004). 
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contravention of Delaware Corporate law.”104 The court then stayed its 
order to permit the parties to fully brief the issue.105 
At the same time the district court was hearing the SEC enforcement 
action, the Delaware Chancery Court was being asked to decide, among 
other things, whether Black had breached his fiduciary duties to 
International.106 In response, Black argued that a poison pill plan adopted by 
the International board, when combined with the springing Corporate 
Monitor provision, was illegal because it violated the Blasius compelling 
justification standard of review.107 This argument required the court to 
discuss the Corporate Monitor provision. Although Vice Chancellor Strine 
did not directly rule on the legality of the remedy,108 his observations are 
instructive. He focused on three factors. First, he pointed out that the 
Corporate Monitor provision was narrowly drafted, noting that it was 
“tailored to protecting the Special Committee process . . . .”109 Second, he 
observed that the Corporate Monitor did not have unilateral veto power. 
According to the court, the consent decree required the Corporate Monitor 
to go to district court “in order to stop what he perceived as wrongful 
actions” by Black.110 And, finally, he noted that the Corporate Monitor 
provision was of “limited duration,” lasting only until International’s 
Special Committee had completed its work.111 
Vice Chancellor Strine’s approach to the issue indicates that the legality 
of the position of Corporate Monitor turns on the grant of authority from the 
district court. Using the factors he identified in the Hollinger opinion, the 
appointment of a Corporate Monitor with far-reaching powers is arguably a 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. at *24. 
 105. After the rehearing, the district court ultimately decided to deny Black’s motion to vacate 
the consent decree, relying on the related Chancery Court decision discussed below. The district 
court held that collateral estoppel precluded Black from re-litigating the legality of the consent 
decree. According to the district court: 
[W]hile the Delaware court did not actually address whether the Consent Judgment was 
properly entered, the validity of the Consent Judgment, as it operated with the Rights 
Plan, was actually litigated and essential to the court’s decision that International did 
not violate Delaware law in enacting the Rights Plan and the Consent Judgment. 
Hollinger, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9097, at *14. 
 106. See Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 559 
(Del. 2005). 
 107. In Blasius, the Delaware Chancery Court adopted a heightened standard of review for 
board action that is taken for the primary purpose of interfering with or impending with the 
effectiveness of a shareholder vote. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 
(Del. Ch. 1988). If a court determines that the Blasius standard of review should be applied, the 
board’s action will be struck down unless the board can show a compelling justification, which is 
an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. Id. at 661. 
 108. As the Delaware Chancery Court noted, there was no direct challenge to the consent 
decree before it. See Hollinger, 844 A.2d at 1052 n.63. 
 109. See id. at 1089. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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violation of Delaware corporate law. This conclusion is seen by applying 
the Hollinger factors to the WorldCom Corporate Monitor. The authority of 
WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor was not narrowly drafted. Although the 
judicial grant of authority to the Corporate Monitor was initially tailored to 
supplement the injunction against the destruction of evidence and the 
payment of excessive executive compensation,112 Mr. Breeden’s authority 
expanded dramatically to the point where he was re-writing the company’s 
corporate governance provisions113 and was participating in important 
business decisions.114 With this kind of authority, one cannot claim that the 
WorldCom Corporate Monitor’s authority was narrowly tailored. 
Moreover, unlike the springing Corporate Monitor provision in the 
Hollinger case, WorldCom’s Corporate Monitor did have veto power over 
certain WorldCom business decisions. The court order expressly stated that 
all compensation decisions at WorldCom had to be approved in advance by 
Mr. Breeden.115 Thus, the WorldCom Corporate Monitor did not have to 
seek out court approval if he believed that the company was violating the 
terms of the court order. 
Finally, the Corporate Monitor in WorldCom was not appointed for a 
limited term. Rather, the term was quite indefinite. According to the 
applicable court order, “[t]he term of the Corporate Monitor will cease no 
later than the date on which the Commission’s investigation of this matter 
concludes, the Court determines the function of the Corporate Monitor is no 
longer necessary, or the parties so agree.”116 In fact, Mr. Breeden continued 
as Corporate Monitor even after WorldCom settled with the SEC, after 
WorldCom adopted Mr. Breeden’s corporate governance proposals, and 
even after the company emerged from bankruptcy. It was only after 
WorldCom was acquired by Verizon that the Corporate Monitor position 
was terminated,117 approximately two and a half years after his 
appointment. 
Thus, courts must weigh the circumstances of particular situations to 
determine whether the appointment of a Corporate Monitor is legal under 
state corporate law. The Chancery Court decision suggests that it depends 
on the power exercised by the Corporate Monitor. 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 113. See supra Part III.A.5. 
 114. See supra Part III.B. 
 115. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 116. WorldCom June 28 Stipulation and Order, supra note 28, at 3–4. 
 117. See MCI Inc.: SEC Voices No Objection to End of Monitor Review Post-Merger, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 15, 2005, at A12; Global Press Release, MCI, Washington is Final State to Approve 
Verizon-MCI Transaction (Dec. 23, 2005), http://global.mci.com/ca/news/press_releases/. If 
WorldCom had not been acquired, Mr. Breeden would probably be winding up his position right 
about now. See, e.g., Lublin & Young, supra note 1 (referring to Judge Rakoff’s statement, made 
prior to the corporate merger, that Mr. Breeden would probably continue as WorldCom’s 
Corporate Monitor for “another two years or so”). 
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H. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITH THE BANKRUPTCY COURT 
If a corporation with a court-appointed Corporate Monitor has declared 
bankruptcy,118 the Corporate Monitor or the federal district court actions 
and powers may conflict with those of the bankruptcy court or the 
bankruptcy trustee. The potential for conflict arises because a company 
operating during bankruptcy does so under the supervision of the 
bankruptcy court. Two judges will therefore be supervising the company’s 
operations, which raises several questions. What would happen if the 
district court in an SEC enforcement proceeding authorized certain 
payments by the company, but the bankruptcy judge disallowed them under 
bankruptcy law? Or what would happen if the bankruptcy court permitted 
the debtor to make certain payments, but the Corporate Monitor, backed by 
the federal district court, would not approve them?119 This conflict could 
have easily arisen in WorldCom if, for example, the district court approved 
Mr. Breeden’s fees as Corporate Monitor, but the bankruptcy judge 
determined that these fees were not allowed under the Bankruptcy Code.120 
Fortunately, in WorldCom, the federal district court judge and the 
bankruptcy judge worked well together.121 However, there is no guarantee 
that judges in future cases would be in agreement on such issues. A 
disagreement between the two courts would raise significant jurisdictional 
issues that are beyond the scope of this article. 
                                                                                                                 
 118. This is a realistic possibility. Companies that engage in securities fraud may be forced to 
seek the protections of bankruptcy law as their true financial condition is revealed. That certainly 
occurred with companies such as WorldCom, Enron, and Adelphia, each of which declared 
bankruptcy after the accounting fraud was uncovered. 
 119. In WorldCom, the District Court Judge actually recognized this danger. After WorldCom 
declared bankruptcy, the District Court Judge entered an order clarifying the authority of the 
Corporate Monitor. In that order, Judge Rakoff noted, “The fact that all compensation 
arrangements must be approved in advance by the Corporate Monitor does not eliminate the 
requirement that some or all of these expenditures may also need to be approved by the 
Bankruptcy Court, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code.” See Memorandum Order at 3, SEC 
v. WorldCom, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14201, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2002) (No. 02 Civ. 
4963). However, he raised the specter of a conflict by cautioning that “[w]hat is ‘normal’ for a 
company in bankruptcy reorganization may not necessarily be permissible for a company that 
stands accused of fraud.” See id. at 3–4. 
 120. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the company may pay “reasonable compensation for actual, 
necessary services rendered.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 330(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2005). 
 121. Apparently, one near conflict did occur in WorldCom when several firms that had 
provided advice in connection with WorldCom’s bankruptcy case submitted bills to the 
bankruptcy court. These submissions were made in conformity with the Bankruptcy Code, but had 
not been previously approved by the Corporate Monitor as required by a budgeting order issued 
by the District Court. When this came to the attention of the District Court Judge, he issued an 
order barring WorldCom from paying any of these fees, but indicated he might grant relief from 
the budgeting order and recommended that the firms submit applications for relief to the court. 
The District Court Judge directed the Corporate Monitor to review the applications and make 
recommendations as to whether the firms should be paid. Order at 3–5, SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 
No. 02 Civ. 4963 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2004). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the use of the Corporate Monitor raises several significant 
concerns, this article does not recommend prohibiting the remedy 
altogether. If used correctly, and in a limited fashion, the Corporate Monitor 
can be an extremely effective remedy that helps the SEC in its enforcement 
mission.122 Instead, this article argues for restraint, both from the SEC in 
seeking this remedy and from the courts in granting this remedy. 
A. THE SEC SHOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN SEEKING A 
CORPORATE MONITOR 
The concerns addressed above suggest that the SEC should exercise 
restraint in seeking the appointment of a Corporate Monitor. Indeed, it 
appears that the SEC is reserving this ancillary remedy only for extreme 
cases of securities fraud. A high-ranking SEC official stated that the SEC 
will consider a Corporate Monitor “in unusual circumstances where 
management has demonstrated it can’t be trusted to act in the best interests 
of the investors.”123 
Given the implications of the Corporate Monitor, the SEC’s caution in 
seeking the remedy is appropriate and should be commended. However, the 
SEC must provide more guidance as to when “unusual circumstances” are 
present and as to when the SEC would conclude that company management 
“can’t be trusted to act in the best interests of the investors.” Since 
securities fraud is allegedly involved in many enforcement cases, “unusual 
circumstances” must mean something more than ordinary corporate 
misconduct or disclosure violations. Does “unusual circumstances” mean 
situations where the management is suspected of obstructing justice? On the 
other hand, several of the Corporate Monitor cases involved allegations that 
                                                                                                                 
 122. In addition, the appointment of a Corporate Monitor may offer other advantages. Professor 
James Fanto has recently proposed that the SEC should be empowered to “appoint a corporate 
governance monitor” for certain public companies, which would have a role similar to that of the 
bank examiner. James A. Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: 
Lessons from Bank Regulation 4 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 49, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=873667. Professor 
Fanto argues that the presence of an independent monitor will help break down certain 
psychological impediments preventing the effective supervision of corporate management. See id. 
at 41–44. In addition, according to Professor Fanto, it will have the advantage of: 
bringing into the open the paternalistic regulation that is already occurring through the 
SEC’s enhanced enforcement powers over public firm management and the increasing 
criminalization of management’s behavior, and of balancing this enforcement with 
guidance so that SEC regulation does not just punish firm executives without offering 
them any accompanying benefits. 
Id. at 4–5. 
 123. Sue Reisinger, Corporate Monitors Catching On, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 8 (quoting 
Peter Bresnan, then Associate Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division). 
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management was stealing from the corporation, either by paying excessive 
salaries or by outright misappropriation of funds. Does this amount to an 
“unusual circumstance” that would result in the SEC’s decision to seek this 
ancillary relief? Or does the SEC have other situations in mind as well? 
Similarly, when can the company management no longer be trusted to 
act in the “best interests of investors?” Once again, the SEC must be 
envisioning behavior that consists of more than just corporate misconduct 
or disclosure violations; otherwise, the SEC could conceivably seek a 
Corporate Monitor in virtually every enforcement action. In several of the 
Corporate Monitor cases, managers were also accused of criminal violations 
of the securities laws. Obviously, criminal conduct makes it more difficult 
to trust managers to act in the “best interests of investors,” but does this 
mean that the SEC believes that corporate managers cannot be trusted only 
if their conduct is so egregious as to lead to a criminal investigation? If 
something less than a knowing or intentional violation of the federal 
securities laws will lead to this determination, what kinds of behavior will 
lead the SEC to seek a Corporate Monitor? Is the SEC looking for a long-
standing pattern of securities fraud, so that there is real concern that the 
company will continue to violate the securities laws? If that is the case, 
what would be the effect of replacing the wrongdoers? A company that has 
cleaned house can be trusted to act in the “best interests of investors,” 
which suggests that the SEC should not seek a Corporate Monitor in this 
situation. 
Although SEC representatives have publicly stated that the SEC will 
exercise restraint in seeking this remedy, additional guidance concerning 
their decision-making process would be helpful.124 Published guidance 
would assist those companies under SEC investigation in making informed 
litigation decisions, including the decision to consent to a Corporate 
Monitor or to other novel ancillary remedies. More importantly, by 
publishing guidance, the SEC will help ensure that it continues to exercise 
restraint in seeking a Corporate Monitor, reducing the danger of SEC 
overreaching and will reinforce the extraordinary nature of the remedy. In 
addition, before seeking the remedy, the staff will have to ascertain that the 
enforcement guidelines set forth by the SEC have been met. 
                                                                                                                 
 124. There is precedent for the publication of factors impacting SEC enforcement decisions. In 
the well-known Seaboard Release, the SEC set forth the criteria it uses in determining “whether, 
and how much, to credit self-policing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation” in its decision 
to bring enforcement actions. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship to Agency 
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 44969, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 1470, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2210 (Oct. 23, 2001). More recently, the SEC 
published the factors it will consider in its decision to impose penalties against corporations. See 
Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, Press 
Release No. 2006-4, 2006 SEC NEWS LEXIS 12 (Jan. 4, 2006). 
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B. COURTS SHOULD APPOINT A CORPORATE MONITOR ONLY IN 
RARE CASES 
In the past, the district court’s power to order novel ancillary remedies 
had been questioned. Following SOX, the court’s power to appoint an 
independent director, or a special investigator, or a Corporate Monitor, is 
established.125 The only limitation on the court’s power, that the relief must 
be “appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors,” is extremely 
narrow. But just because a court has the power to appoint a Corporate 
Monitor does not mean it should. As the above discussion demonstrates, 
appointing a Corporate Monitor raises several significant concerns. In 
recognition of these concerns, courts should exercise self-restraint when 
deciding whether to appoint a Corporate Monitor. 
Courts should articulate clear judicial standards126 that must be met 
before a Corporate Monitor is appointed to help ensure that this ancillary 
remedy is used only in rare cases. The court should begin with a 
presumption that an injunction is ordinarily sufficient to enforce the federal 
securities laws. To obtain a Corporate Monitor, the court should require the 
SEC to demonstrate to the court that the injunction is not sufficient to 
ensure compliance and that there is reason to doubt that the corporation will 
comply with the injunction. The court should weigh this danger against the 
dangers that: (1) a Corporate Monitor can significantly interfere with the 
effective management of a company; (2) a Corporate Monitor is account-
able only to the court, to the possible detriment of absent shareholders; (3) a 
Corporate Monitor can lead to potential overreaching by the SEC; and (4) a 
Corporate Monitor might conflict with state corporate law. The court should 
order a Corporate Monitor only if it finds that the danger of non-compliance 
outweighs these concerns.127 If a court decides to appoint a Corporate 
Monitor, it should issue a written order demonstrating that this discretion-
limiting balancing test has been met. In WorldCom, Judge Rakoff did not 
disclose in writing why he decided to order the novel remedy. This lack of 
scrutiny contrasts sharply with the thorough and thoughtful analysis in the 
                                                                                                                 
 125. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 126. There is a long history of courts creating rules to limit their equitable powers. The most 
obvious example is the injunction. Before ordering an injunction, courts ordinarily must find that 
the moving party would suffer irreparable harm without it. In addition, courts have articulated 
exacting standards that the SEC must meet before the court will order a receivership. See James R. 
Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779, 1784–86 
(1976). 
 127. The need for clear judicial standards is especially important because it is unlikely that an 
order to appoint a Corporate Monitor will be reviewed by an appellate court. If the SEC obtains 
the appointment of Corporate Monitor through a consent decree, there will be no appeal. In the 
unlikely event that the Corporate Monitor is appointed in a contested case, the company will have 
to wait until the case has been heard and the judgment is final before it can appeal the order, 
meaning that the Corporate Monitor will be overseeing the company during the pendency of the 
enforcement action. Even if the order is ultimately appealed, the order will be reviewed under the 
forgiving abuse of discretion standard, which will be difficult for the company to overcome. 
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court’s decision to approve the penalty in the WorldCom case. In a 14-page 
Opinion and Order, the court assessed whether the penalty would be in the 
public interest and whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”128 
The court should give careful scrutiny to its choice of Corporate 
Monitor. As discussed above,129 the SEC may exert too much influence on 
the selection process. This concern argues for a transparent selection 
process. To ensure transparency, the court should disclose the names of the 
potential Corporate Monitors, as well as their resumes.130 The court should 
determine whether the candidates have any ties to the SEC, including 
whether the SEC has recommended the candidate for any other court-
appointed position. The court should also make the financial terms of the 
engagement of the Corporate Monitor public. The court should explain the 
choice for Corporate Monitor in reasonable detail.131 
Most importantly, the court should carefully define the scope of the 
Corporate Monitor’s duties. If the court expands the duties of the Corporate 
Monitor, it should be justified on the record. One of the most troubling 
aspects of the WorldCom Corporate Monitor was the de facto expansion of 
his power. Courts should be sensitive to this concern. Similarly, the 
duration of the Corporate Monitor’s appointment should be limited to a 
defined term. Given the concerns addressed above, courts should be 
hesitant to permit a Corporate Monitor to exercise broad oversight of a 
company for an unlimited amount of time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Enforcing the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws is an 
extremely difficult task, and the SEC needs to have effective weapons in its 
arsenal to deter corporate misconduct and protect investors. As 
demonstrated by the Corporate Monitor’s role in WorldCom, the 
appointment of a Corporate Monitor can be an effective weapon for the 
SEC. However, there are significant dangers inherent in its use, which 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 129. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.F. 
 130. The appointment of a Corporate Monitor raises other disclosure issues, as well. 
Specifically, a public company must make adequate disclosure of the Corporate Monitor in its 
public reports. Such disclosure should accurately present the breadth of the Corporate Monitor’s 
authority and describe his influence on the company’s management. 
 131. The transparency of the selection process in WorldCom could have been better. Although 
there was a public hearing, there is very little information available about the actual selection 
process, except that Mr. Breeden was chosen by the court from a list of three names jointly 
provided by the SEC and the company. The transcript reveals very little of the court’s deliberative 
process. The applicable part of the transcript consists of three short paragraphs, noting (1) Mr. 
Breeden’s experience as former Chairman of the SEC and as head of company specializing in 
corporate turnarounds; (2) that he is a lawyer; and (3) that he owned 6,000 shares of WorldCom 
stock that he pledged to divest as soon as possible. See WorldCom Transcript of Record, supra 
note 30, at 2–3. 
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suggest that the SEC should seek a Corporate Monitor only in rare cases. In 
addition, in recognition of these dangers, courts should develop standards 
limiting their judicial discretion to order this extraordinary remedy. After 
all, as Mr. Breeden’s quote at the beginning of this article notes, it is an 
unusual role where a judicially-appointed officer has veto power over the 
audit committee chairman and the CEO, and it should stay that way. 
